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The Determinants of the Global Digital Divide
A Cross-Country Analysis of Computer and Internet Penetration
Menzie D. Chinn and Robert W. Fairlie
Abstract
To identify the determinants of cross-country disparities in personal computer and Internet
penetration, we examine a panel of 161 countries over the 1999-2001 period. Our candidate
variables include economic variables (income per capita, years of schooling, illiteracy, trade
openness), demographic variables (youth and aged dependency ratios, urbanization rate),
infrastructure indicators (telephone density, electricity consumption), telecommunications pricing
measures, and regulatory quality. With the exception of trade openness and the telecom pricing
measures, these variables enter in as statistically significant in most specifications for computer use.
A similar pattern holds true for Internet use, except that telephone density and aged dependency
matter less. The global digital divide is mainly – but by no means entirely – accounted for by income
differentials. For computers, telephone density and regulatory quality are of second and third
importance, while for the Internet, this ordering is reversed. The region-specific explanations for
large disparities in computer and Internet penetration are generally very similar. Our results suggest
that public investment in human capital, telecommunications infrastructure, and the regulatory
infrastructure can mitigate the gap in PC and Internet use.

Keywords: Computers, Internet, Digital Divide, Infrastructure, Pricing, Regulation
JEL Classification: O30, L96

1. Introduction
The study of how new technologies have diffused throughout the economy has been, and
remains, a field of intense activity. Recent events, including the acceleration of productivity
growth in the United States since 1995, have only served to heighten interest in this area since
the acceleration appears to be connected with greater investment in information and
communication technologies (ICTs). The consensus view is that the acceleration in productivity
growth has been manifest at both the country and firm level of analysis (Jorgenson, 2001).
Admittedly, some debate remains over the exact origins of the improved performance. While
several studies have cast a skeptical eye upon the ICT-productivity story (DiNardo and Pischke,
1997; Gordon, 2000), the preponderance of the literature attributes the improvement to the
introduction of new technologies (Autor, et al., 1998; Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2003; Council of
Economic Advisers, 2001).
Interest in the global diffusion of technology has also been spurred by arguments that it
may increase knowledge diffusion through improving communication efficiency (e.g. Jovanovic
and Rob, 1989), improve political engagement (Norris, 2001), and allow developing countries to
"leapfrog" traditional methods of increasing productivity (Steinmueller, 2003). In this light, the
striking international differences in information and communication technology (ICT) diffusion
that exist today, often referred to as the "Global Digital Divide," may pose a serious challenge to
policymakers. Many developing countries have computer and Internet penetration rates that are
1/100th of the rates found in North America and Europe. For example, there are less than 6
personal computers per 1000 people in India, whereas more than 6 out of 10 people in the United
States own a computer (ITU 2003).
Although these differences in technology diffusion may have substantial economic
consequences, the empirical literature aimed at identifying the causes is limited. A few factors
have been identified as being important, such as differentials in income, human capital,
regulatory effectiveness, and telecommunications infrastructure (see Dasgupta, et al., 2001, and
Wallsten, 2003 for example), but a definitive study is lacking. We remedy this deficiency in the
literature with a comprehensive econometric analysis of the determinants of computer and
Internet use that spans both developed and developing countries and includes a wide-range of
economic, demographic and policy factors. Most previous studies have been limited in scope,
either adopting a regional focus, or considering only a small set of variables.
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Our paper also provides the following innovation: in addition to isolating the empirical
determinants of computer and Internet use, we undertake a systematic analysis of the relative
importance of different factors in contributing to the global digital divide. Borrowing from a
technique commonly used to decompose earnings gaps between groups (Blinder, 1993 and
Oaxaca, 1993), we estimate separate contributions from regional differences in income, human
capital, telecommunications infrastructure, and other factors.
The contribution results will allow us to directly address several issues that have been
discussed in the literature. One key question is the relative importance of income in explaining
the international digital divide. Many studies find a strong positive relationship between
technology use and income across countries and within countries (see Quibria, et al. 2002,
OECD 2001, and U.S. Department of Commerce 2002 for example), while some point to other
factors -- such as telecommunications access and pricing -- as being of major importance
(Dasgupta, et al. 2001 and Mann et al. 2000).
Another set of questions are prompted by findings in the recent growth literature that
highlight the roles of human capital and institutional factors. The channels through which these
factors affect growth are difficult to discern, but it is likely that both exert at least some influence
on the rate at which new technologies are adopted.1 Hence, the first question is how important is
human capital for creating demand for information and communication technology services?
Computers may require substantial levels of education for use, but telephones and the Internet
may require very little, according to Dasgupta, et al. (2001). Another question pertains to the
impact of institutional regimes. Do factors such as legal protections and regulatory quality matter
even after accounting for income? Wallsten (2003), among others, has focused on this issue.
To anticipate our results, we find that while income per capita is important in explaining
the digital divide, so too are factors such as the communication infrastructure (as measured by
telephone mainlines density), access to electricity, the institutional environment in the form of
regulatory efficacy and the protection of property rights, and demographic characteristics. These
findings inform our conclusions regarding the first two hypotheses: the income per capita
differential accounts for the single most important component of the digital divide, but it is not
by any means the only component. Differences in the telecommunications infrastructure are also
1

The literature ascribing a role to human capital is too voluminous to cite; the canonical references include Barro
(1991), whereas a recent survey is Temple (2001). For institutional factors, see Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu, et
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important, but are not terribly important for the Internet digital divide – rather it is more critical
to the computer divide.
Additional results include a negative impact of urbanization on Internet use, and perhaps
most interestingly, a large (positive) impact of regulatory quality or property rights on the
Internet digital divide. The latter suggests that the diffusion of the Internet may be particularly
dependent upon the quality of institutions prevailing in an economy. Finally, the results for
demographic controls suggest that the global digital divide would be even larger if developing
countries had an age composition that was more similar to the United States.

2. Surveying the Literature
To our knowledge, there are no systematic cross-country econometric analyses of the
determinants of PC and Internet use, spanning both developed and developing countries, and a
period including the last few years. Many of the extant studies have a regional focus, especially
when assessing the spread of Internet use.
One of the most extensive cross-country studies of personal computer adoption is by
Caselli and Coleman (2001). They examine a dataset encompassing up to 89 countries over the
years 1970-90, focusing on the computer imports/worker ratio, as a proxy measure for the
investment in ICT. In attempting to explain the variation in this variable, they rely upon a large
set of variables, including income per worker, investment per worker, structural descriptors (the
sectoral shares of agriculture and manufacturing), human capital, imports and exports from and
to the OECD. They also include an institutional variable, in this case an index of property rights.
Openness to imports from OECD countries, the level of educational attainment, and the index of
property rights are three notable variables than enter with statistical significance.
Pohjola (2003) studies observed investment in information and communication
technology in 49 countries over a more recent period, 1993-2000. He regresses ICT investment
per capita on income per capita, the relative price of ICT equipment, human capital measures, the
share of agriculture and openness to international trade. In addition to finding the typically high
elasticity of ICT investment with respect to income (around unity), he also detects a major role
for human capital and a negative impact of agriculture’s importance in the economy.2

al. (2001), and Rodrik et al. (2002).
2
Unlike other cross country studies, a price variable is included, and enters into the regressions with statistical
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As a more recent technological innovation, there are far fewer examples of cross-country
analyses of the determinants of Internet use. One cross-country study was conducted by
Dasgupta, et al. (2001). They examine Internet use in a sample of 44 countries, spanning both
OECD and developing countries, from 1990 to 1997. Their variable of focus is the Internet to
telephone mainlines ratio as a dependent variable. The growth rate in this variable over the
sample period is related to initial (1990) values of the Internet to telephone mainlines ratio, the
urban population, income per capita, and an index of competition policy, as well as some
regional dummies. The results – including a negative impact of income per capita – are
somewhat difficult to interpret for a number of reasons. First, the sample period is quite early –
1990-1997. Even at the end of the sample, many countries still had very low levels of Internet
penetration, so the lessons that one can draw from the analysis are tentative. Second, the
inclusion of regional dummies complicates the interpretation of the income variable coefficient.3
Kiiski and Pohjola (2001) examine a more recent sample, 1995-2000, and use a more
conventional measure of the Internet – namely Internet hosts per 1000 inhabitants. In a broad
sample encompassing about sixty OECD and developing countries, the five year growth in this
variable is related to income per capita, telephone access costs, and the average years of
schooling. More recently, focus has switched to policy related variables. Most recently, Wallsten
(2003) examines a developing country sample of 45 countries in 2001. He relates Internet users
and Internet hosts to the standard variables as well as measures of regulatory regime
characteristics, including agency independence, transparency, and discretion. Price regulation is
also examined. One problem in interpretation arises from the use of PCs per capita variable as a
control variable. The inclusion of this variable raises the possibility of simultaneity bias, among
other things.
One interesting study with a regional focus is APEC (2002).4 The 21 economies of
APEC span a wider set of income per capita than those found in other studies, and hence may be

significance. However, since the price variable is the same for all countries in the panel (the US deflator for
computer purchases), it is unclear what interpretation to attribute to this result. The price index is highly trended
(downward) so the inclusion of the price index probably mimics that of a time trend.
3
In addition, the dependent variable is somewhat unconventional: internet subscribers expressed as a ratio to
telephone mainlines. This implies a long run unitary elasticity of subscribers to phone lines.
4
There are a number of additional studies that have a distinctly regional focus. See Estache, et al. (2002), who focus
on Latin America. Mann and Rosen (2001) examine the Asia-Pacific economies, while Oyelaran and Oyeyinka
(2003) study the African experience.
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more informative than more regionally focused studies.5 APEC (2002) finds the user access cost
(the cost of a 3 minute local call), political freedom, income per capita in 1995 US dollars, an
urban population proportion, adult literacy rate, and the share of service valued added in GDP as
statistically important determinants. Access charges and the lack of political freedom are
negatively associated with Internet penetration, while income per capita, the urban ratio, literacy,
and a large service sector share are all positively associated.6
In a related line of research, a few recent studies have explored the determinants of the
digital divide between demographic groups within countries. Using microdata from the U.S.
Current Population Survey, a few recent studies have explored the causes of the digital divide
across racial groups (U.S. Department of Commerce 2000, Fairlie 2003, and Novak and
Hoffman 1998). Racial disparities in access to computers and the Internet appear to be
primarily, but not entirely, due to disparities in income and education, and language barriers.
Research using microdata from other countries suggests that income and education are important
determinants of computer ownership and Internet use, and thus may contribute to digital divides
within those countries (see for example, OECD 2001 for several countries, Primrose (2003) for
Australia, Singh (2004) for Canada, and Ono and Zavodny 2003 for Japan).
Note that in none of the previous studies has there been a quantification of the relative
importance of different factors in explaining the digital divide. That is, while there are a number
of studies that relate per capita computer stock and Internet penetration to purported
determinants, or discuss the statistical significance of the estimated coefficients, none of them
decomposes the gaps between, say, the United States and Africa, into portions attributable to
regulatory differences, or to telephone density.

3. Data
Data on technology use and telecommunications are from the International
Telecommunications Union’s (ITU) World Telecommunication Indicators Database. The data
are obtained primarily through annual questionnaires administered by the Telecommunications
Development Bureau (BDT) of the ITU. Supplemental information is obtained from reports
5

The United States has the highest income per capita in the grouping, at $31,600 in 2001, while Papua New Guinea
has the lowest at $897; the economies are located in both of the Americas, Asia, and Oceania.
6
The supporting study by Liu and San (undated) reports similar results for a broader sample, using a Gompertz
specification of technology diffusion.
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from telecommunication ministries, regulators, operators, and ITU staff. Detailed data are
available on telephone, personal computer, Internet, and other telecommunications and
electronics use. The ITU data also contain detailed information on telephone costs.
Computer and Internet penetration rates analyzed below are derived from the number of
personal computers and Internet users per 100 people. These measures of technology use from
the ITU are the only ones available for a large number of countries over the past several years.
However, they may suffer from two notable limitations. First, the number of personal computers
may understate the total use of computers in some countries in which mainframe computers are
prevalent (World Bank 2002). This is probably less of a concern, however, focusing on more
recent data with the rise of networked PCs. Second, the number of Internet users is based on
reported estimates of users, derivations from reported Internet Access Provider (ISP) subscriber
counts, or calculated by multiplying the number of Internet hosts by an estimated multiplier.
Thus, Internet use may be understated, particularly in developing countries where many
commercial subscribers rent computers connected to the Internet (World Bank 2002).7
The primary source for data on demographics, income, and other variables included in
the regression analysis is the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database. We also use
indices of rule of law and regulatory quality drawn from the World Bank’s Governance
Indicators database. The construction and attributes of these indicators are described in much
greater detail in Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastrizzi (2003). Our primary measure of human capital,
average years of schooling, is derived from the World Bank’s Edstats. More details on all
variables included in the analysis are provided in the Appendix.

4. Cross-Country Differences in Computer and Internet Penetration Rates
Computer and Internet use has grown rapidly over the past decade. As reported in Figure
1, there were only 2.5 personal computers per 100 people in the world in 1990. By 2001, the
number of computers per 100 people had climbed to nearly 9. Internet use grew from essentially
zero in the early 1990s to 8.1 percent of the world's population by 2001.

7

Estimates of the number of Internet hosts in a country may also have measurement problems because they are
based on country codes and do not necessarily capture the physical location of the host. Furthermore, hosts that do
not have a country code are assigned to the United States (Wallsten 2003).
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The relatively high current rates of use, however, mask large disparities across regions of
the world.8 Figure 2 reports computer penetration rates by region in 2001.9 In North America,
there are 61.1 computers per 100 people, whereas there are only 0.5 computers per 100 people in
South Asia. Computer penetration rates in Sub-Saharan Africa are also strikingly low with only
1.0 personal computers per 100 people. Other regions have higher penetration rates, but none of
these is as large as one-third the North American rate. Even in Europe and Central Asia, there
exist only 18.1 personal computers per 100 people.
A comparison of Internet penetration rates reveals similar regional patterns (Figure 3). In
North America, roughly one half of the population uses the Internet. In contrast, slightly more
than one half of one percent of the population uses the Internet in South Asia and Sub-Saharan
Africa. Internet use is higher in Europe and Central Asia with 16.5 users per 100 people, but
very low in other regions of the world. Internet penetration rates in East Asia and the Pacific,
Latin America and the Caribbean, and The Middle East and Africa are only 6.9, 5.0 and 2.4 per
100 people, respectively.
Examining computer and Internet penetration rates across countries also reveals
interesting patterns. Table 1 reports countries with the highest and lowest computer penetration
rates.10 The United States has the highest computer penetration rate. Perhaps not surprisingly,
the top ten also contains many European countries (Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, Norway and
the Netherlands) and Canada. Australia, Singapore and Korea also have high computer
penetration rates. All of these countries are relatively wealthy with the exception of Korea.
The bottom of the distribution is mainly comprised of very poor countries in Sub-Saharan
Africa. All of the reported countries have computer penetration rates of less than 2 users per
1000 people. The computer penetration rate in the United States, for example, is nearly 550
times larger than the penetration rate in Ethiopia. Two countries located in East Asia and the
Pacific, Cambodia and Myanmar, also have extremely low computer penetration rates. In

8

Fink and Kenny (2003) note that growth rates in Internet use per capita have been higher in poor countries than
those in wealthy countries, and thus the digital divide is shrinking. Given the large differences that exist today, it
may be a considerable amount of time before we witness convergence in Internet use. They also point out that the
digital divide is not apparent when Internet use is normalized by GDP rather than population. We retain our focus,
however, on the conventional per capita measures of ICT use, and identify how much of the gap is explained by
income differences in a multivariate analysis.
9
Regional definitions are from the World Bank.
10
We do not report estimates for countries with populations under 1 million.
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Cambodia, there are only 0.15 computers per 100 people and in Myanmar there are only 0.11
computers per 100 people.
Table 1 also reports estimates of computer penetration for the largest countries in the
world. Japan has a relatively high computer penetration rate, whereas the other largest countries
in the world have relatively low computer penetration rates. In China, there are less than 2
personal computers per 100 people. The computer penetration rate is even lower in India. There
are only 0.58 computers per 100 people.
Internet penetration rates generally follow the same patterns across countries as computer
penetration rates. As expected, the ranking of countries by computer penetration rates is roughly
similar to the ranking of countries by Internet penetration rates.11 Some interesting changes,
however, occur at the top of the distribution. Most notably, Korea and Sweden have Internet
penetration rates that are slightly higher than the U.S. rate. Also, New Zealand (46.1) and
Finland (43.0) enter the list of top 10 countries displacing Switzerland and Australia. There is
more movement into and out of the bottom ten list, but all of these countries have both computer
and Internet penetration rates well below 1 per 100 people.

5. The Determinants of Computer and Internet Use
5.1 Empirical Model of Computer Use
The basic framework for analyzing the use of personal computers and the Internet is
simply a demand and supply one. Demand is driven by consumers and firms, whereas supply is
driven by a few countries that export the bulk of equipment (for computer use) and many firms
in all countries (for Internet providers). In the case of computers, they represent a derived
demand, insofar as firms are concerned; and a final demand for consumers. For firms, the
marginal product of ICT equipment is a function of the demand for the final good produced,
which will be correlated with income per capita. The “after-tax” price of goods sold will also
depend upon how burdened firms are by regulations; inefficiently implemented regulations, or
regimes where expropriation is the norm, will reduce the expected return to investing in capital
of all sorts, and hence reduce the derived demand for ICT equipment.
The productivity of ICT equipment depends upon the attributes of the labor stock if labor
and ICT equipment are complements. Hence, the stock of human capital, measured by either
11

Only 24.2 percent of all countries had rankings that were more than 10 places apart.
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years of schooling, or the illiteracy rate, should be important. Another complementary input is
power consumption; clearly a PC is of limited use without adequate or consistent power supply.
Of course, after some threshold of connectivity or power level, ICT equipment and electricity
might be substitutes. Finally, the productivity of a computer might be enhanced by telephone
access. Telecommunications infrastructure might then be another complementary input.
Income is likely to be a key determinant of the consumer demand for computers. It has
an effect on consumers' budget constraints, and it may also affect preferences for owning a
computer, especially in the sense of "keeping up with the Joneses." Income may be especially
important in the presence of liquidity constraints. Although some consumers may view
computers as a worthwhile investment they may not be able to finance the purchase of one.
Preferences for owning a computer are also likely to vary across individuals and may depend on
exposure to and the perceived usefulness of owning a computer.12 This may be related to a
person's education level, age, presence of children, and urban/rural location.
To estimate the demand function, one would need to be able to identify some exogenous
variables in the supply equation. In the case of computers, one candidate variable is obvious –
the price of computers. On a global scale, this appears to be driven by exogenous forces
(Moore’s Law) at the level of analysis we are concerned with. An examination of the hedonic
price indices calculated for ICT equipment in the US provides forceful evidence for large
movements in the relative price of computing power. Indeed, Pohjola (2003) uses the US price of
computing equipment as the price of computers in all economies he studies. Since this price
index looks very similar to a (downward sloped) linear trend, it is not clear that in a structural
setup, even one demand parameter could be identified (especially if there are deterministic time
trends in the demand function). Consequently, we rely upon a reduced form estimation
procedure, and assume that we cannot identify the underlying structural parameters.
Specifically, we estimate several reduced-form equations for computer penetration rates
that include four main sets of independent variables. The first set includes conventional
infrastructure variables, such as main telephone lines per capita, two measures of Internet access
costs (monthly telephone subscription charges and the cost of a three minute call), and electricity
12

A standard approach using microdata is to create a linear random utility model of the decision to purchase a
computer (see Fairlie 2003 for example). The indirect utilities from the two choices are modelled as functions of
measurable individual characteristics, such as race, sex, income, education, marital status, children, region and
urbanicity.
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consumption.13 The second set includes demographic variables, such as shares of the population
below 14 and above 65, and the share of the population in urban centers. The third set includes
economic variables, such as income per capita and human capital (measured either as years of
schooling or the illiteracy rate). The fourth category includes measures of institutional quality or
policy, such as explicit measures of regulatory quality or trade openness. The latter can be
construed as an economic characteristic, but it is often viewed as an indicator of how high trade
barriers are. And, because trade barriers tend to be correlated with other domestic impediments
to commerce, trade openness is often taken to be an indicator of a less regulated business
environment.
We hypothesize that many of the same factors are likely to influence country-level
Internet penetration rates. In particular, income, telecommunications infrastructure and costs,
and regulatory quality may be especially important determinants of Internet use. We include the
same set of regressors in the reduced-form equations for Internet penetration rates.
We first turn to the results for computer penetration rates from 1999-2001, which are
reported in Table 2. In column (1), the results indicate that there are a number of clearly
identifiable determinants of computer use. Unsurprisingly, income per capita comes in as a
powerful determinant of PC use; each $1000 increase in per capita income is associated with
more than a one percentage point increase in the number of PCs per capita.14 Also not
unexpectedly, human capital appears to be important. A one year increase in average schooling
results in a one percentage point increase in PC penetration. Recent research on the determinants
of computer ownership using microdata also finds strong relationships between computer
ownership, and income and education.15 The positive relationship between per capita income
and computer penetration rates may be partly due to relaxing the budget constraint, changing
preferences, or liquidity constraints.

13

Unfortunately, we do not have a measure of the percent of the population with access to electricity. Instead, we
use per capita electricity consumption as a proxy.
14
Scatter plots of computer penetration rates and income reveal an approximate linear relationship even at different
income levels.
15
Estimates from logit regressions using U.S. microdata indicate that an increase in family income of $50,000 is
associated with a 22 percentage point increase in the probability of having a home computer (or 0.44 percentage
points per $1000 family income, Fairlie 2003). Also, a college graduate has a 16.2 percentage point higher
probability of having a home computer than an high school graduate (or 4.0 percentage points per year of school
assuming 4 years of college). Note, however, that these estimates are not adjusted for the number of family
members (i.e. per capita terms), the number of computers in a household, and non-home computers.

10

One surprising result is the importance of telephone line density. A one percentage point
increase in this variable is associated with a 0.4 percentage point increase in PC penetration. It is
hard to interpret this result; it may be there are complementarities between computers and
telephone lines. Telephone lines may be important for one of the most common uses of
computers, accessing the Internet. Another explanation is that countries that have a well
developed communication infrastructure are also likely to have other unobservable attributes that
encourage PC use.
Demographic variables generally enter in with expected signs. A higher proportion of
youth is associated with greater rate of PC use, while a lower rate will occur with a higher
proportion of seniors, which is consistent with findings from microdata (U.S. Department of
Commerce, 2002). On the other hand, the urban population enters with a significantly negative
coefficient.
In the last set of variables, we find that the regulatory quality variable exhibits a high
level of significance.16 This will be a recurring theme – an index of the economic policy
environment shows up as a statistically important determinant (it will also turn out to be an
economically important one as well, in the decompositions). Interestingly, unlike the outcome in
many other empirical studies of growth, openness to international trade does not appear to be an
important factor in PC use, after including an explicit measure of regulatory efficiency.
One puzzling result is the lack of a role for electricity consumption. There is essentially
no relationship between per capita electricity use and PC penetration. This is surprising as access
to electricity is essential for the use of personal computers. One possibility is that there is a
threshold effect in the electricity-PC use relationship. Widespread availability of a reliable
electricity supply is critical to making PC use economically efficient, and over the range where
electrification is occurring, there may be a close link between consumption and use. Once nearly
all households have access to electricity, the link between electricity consumption and PC use
may break down. To investigate this possibility, we modify our electricity consumption variable
so that values in excess of 6000 kWh per capita are top coded at that value, thus allowing for a
nonlinearity in this relationship. The level of 6000 kWh was chosen because it represents a clear
16

We also estimated a specification that includes a related measure which captures the degree to which agents have
confidence in and abide by the rules of society (rule of law). This coefficient estimate is negative and statistically
significant when added to the equation (perhaps due to its strong correlation with regulatory quality) and statistically
insignificant when entered without regulatory quality.
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breakpoint in the bivariate relationship between electricity consumption and computer
penetration rates.17
The results of estimating this specification are recorded in column (2). The coefficient
estimates are very similar to those in column (1), with the exception of the electricity variable.
The coefficient is now much larger in magnitude and is statistically significant. It implies that
each 1000 kWh increase in per capita electricity consumption is associated with a 1.8 percentage
point increase in PC use, for countries with per capita electricity consumption below 6000 kWh.
As noted above, it appears as though electricity consumption above this level has little effect on
computer penetration rates.18
The use of our preferred measure of human capital, average years of schooling,
constrains the sample size to 227. In column (3) we report the results estimating the regression,
substituting the illiteracy rate for the years of schooling variable. The sample size increases to
273, and while the coefficient estimates on the other variables remain largely unchanged from
column (2), the illiteracy rate has a statistically insignificant effect. The point estimate implies
that a one percentage point increase in the illiteracy rate decreases the PC penetration rate by
only 0.005 percentage points. These results are consistent with PC use requiring high levels of
education and not simply basic literacy.
Another method of increasing the sample size is to drop the telephone cost variables
which are not statistically significant in any of the specifications. We also drop electricity
consumption which is missing for many countries. We obtain a slightly larger coefficient on
income of 1.35 versus 0.96 in column (2). Otherwise, we are impressed by the relative
robustness of the coefficient estimates.
We can substantially increase the sample size by additionally dropping the human capital
variable altogether. At that point, the sample size increases to 417. The sample now spans a
wider set of countries, and gives greater weight to poorer countries, and those that have lower
rates of PC use. The sample computer penetration rate drops to 10.17, as compared to the 14.14
in the baseline specification in column (1).

17

Average per capita electricity consumption is roughly equal to 6000 kWh in Germany, Denmark and the
Netherlands.
18
Estimates including a spline with a break point at 6000 for per capita electricity consumption confirm this. The
slope above 6000 kWh is very close to zero.
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Although the results are qualitatively similar using this larger sample, there are a few
noteworthy changes. The coefficients on youth and aged dependency ratios, and the urban
population ratio are smaller in magnitude. Youth dependency and urban population continue to
be statistically significant determinants of PC use.
The coefficient on regulatory quality declines in absolute value, but remains large,
positive and statistically significant. Consequently, we conclude that the institutional features of
the policy regimes, such as the efficacy of regulatory quality or property rights, are important to
PC use.
We also find that even using a sample size that is nearly twice as large as the one used in
column (2), the coefficients on telephone line density and income change very little. The
estimated effects of these two variables are very robust across the reported specifications.

5.2 Internet Use
We now take up the results for Internet penetration rates. To maximize comparability
with the results for PC penetration rates, we retain the same basic set of regressors in our
specification. In column (1), we find that several variables that were important, statistically, as
determinants for PC penetration are also important factors in Internet penetration. These include
electric power consumption, the youth dependency ratio, urban population (at the 10% level), per
capita income and regulatory quality. Interestingly, the negative effect of regulations on Internet
penetration (i.e. positive coefficient estimate on regulatory quality) is substantially larger than its
effect on computer penetration.19 Another interesting finding is that the human capital variable
does not show up as statistically significant, although it evidences the expected positive sign.
One surprising finding that runs counter to the conventional wisdom is that telephone
density, and the Internet access pricing proxies – the monthly telephone subscription charge and
the average cost of a three minute local call – do not enter in with statistical significance. These
results may differ from those reported in Dasgupta, et al. (2001) and Liu and San (undated)
because we examine a more recent period (1999-2001), and a different sample of countries. In
particular, the effect that Mann, Eckert and Knight (2000) identify – that high per minute charges

19

We find that rule of law has a statistically insignificant coefficient in specifications in which it is added as an
additional regressor or entered without regulatory quality.
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may negatively affect Internet use more than high monthly subscription charge – may be
swamped by other factors in our broader cross-country sample.
We find that the urban population ratio once again enters as a negative factor, which
contrasts with the results in a number of other studies (Liu and San, undated). This finding
suggests that after controlling for telephone density in a country, the Internet substitutes for the
benefits accruing to operating in an urbanized environment. This result is consistent with the
"Global Village Theory," as opposed to the "Urban Density Theory" (see Forman, Goldfarb, and
Greenstein (2003) for a discussion of these theories, and the tests of the associated hypotheses
using data from the US).
Another finding is that trade openness enters in with statistical significance (at the 10%
level), although openness is associated with lower levels of Internet penetration. We discuss this
finding more extensively below.
Most of these results are robust to modifications to the regression specification, including
allowance for a threshold effect in electricity consumption (column (2)). In this particular
specification, the coefficient on electricity consumption doubles in magnitude and becomes
statistically significant, while the human capital variable becomes borderline significant.
Substituting in a different proxy measure for human capital – the illiteracy rate – expands the
sample size considerably (reported in column (3)), but does not yield a statistically significant
effect for human capital, while the inferences regarding the other coefficients are generally
unchanged, with the exception of the telephone density variable (which is now significant at the
10% level).
Dropping the access price proxies, along with the electricity consumption variable, but
reverting to the years of schooling human capital variable, results in the estimates reported in
column (4). With the exception of the income coefficient, which is larger, the coefficients imply
smaller effects than those in column (2). Moreover, the human capital variable is not statistically
significant in this specification.
Column (5) reports the results for a specification that omits the schooling, access price
and electricity consumption variables. Omission of these variables once again increases the
sample size considerably, to 470 observations. In this much larger sample that encompasses
more developing countries, one finds that telephone density is now statistically significant. The
coefficient increases from 0.12 to 0.15 with a large decline in the standard error.
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We also find statistically significant coefficients on the youth dependency ratio, per
capita income, and regulatory quality. Interestingly, urbanization is no longer a statistically
significant factor, suggesting that this is not a robust determinant of Internet use.
Trade openness is not statistically significant in its effects on Internet penetration. At the
same time, regulatory quality has an attenuated impact; the coefficient estimate has declined
from a value of 6.2 in the baseline specification to 2.7, along with a near halving of the standard
errors. This pattern of results suggests to us that trade openness as defined in our data set is
reflecting the effects of large closed economies like the US in the data set. The finding of a
positive effect of trade openness in other studies may reflect the omission of a regulatory/policy
variable such as the one we include in our regressions.
In sum, we identify electricity power consumption, youth dependency, income per capita
and regulatory quality as robust determinants of Internet penetration. While a priori we believe
telephone density and human capital to be important factors as well, the results do not bear out
these beliefs in a broad sample.

5.3 Robustness Checks
To check the sensitivity of our results we estimated several additional regressions. We
first estimated a model for computer penetration rates that includes country fixed effects.
Although our panel only includes three years, the results are somewhat informative. We are
concerned that there are unobserved country-level factors that may be correlated with some of
the explanatory variables leading to biased coefficient estimates. Overall, the results are fairly
similar to those from the random effects model. The coefficient estimates on income and
telephone lines are slightly larger, and the coefficient estimate on regulatory quality is slightly
smaller. The main exceptions are that the coefficient estimates on electric power consumption is
much larger in the fixed effects model than the random effects model and the coefficient estimate
on years of schooling is negative and implausibly large in absolute value. The coefficient
estimate on years of schooling, which is now -10.0484, may be the result of multicollinearity
with the country fixed effects because this variable does not change much over time.
We also estimated a fixed effects model for Internet penetration rates. The coefficient
estimates on the telecommunications variables remain statistically insignificant, and the
coefficient on electrical power consumption is now much smaller and is no longer statistically
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significant. The coefficients on the population variables are much larger in the fixed effects
regression and seem implausible. For example, the coefficient estimates, which are both
statistically significant, imply that an increase of only 1 percentage point in the shares of the
population that are ages 0-14 and 65 and over are associated with Internet penetration rates that
are 3.84 and 5.61 percentage points higher, respectively. We also find large increases in the
coefficients on GNI and years of schooling. The coefficient on years of schooling of 4.77 seems
somewhat implausible. Finally, the coefficient on regulatory quality is somewhat smaller and
the coefficient on trade is somewhat larger. Overall, the fixed effects results differ from the
random effects model with a few cases in which the coefficients are implausibly large. Because
of this concern, the relatively short time period of three years, and the loss of substantial crosssectional variation we do not focus on the fixed effects results below. Furthermore, the
contribution estimates that we present in the following section preclude the use of fixed effects.
We also estimated models that weight countries by their population. Large countries,
such as China and India, contribute substantially to identifying the coefficients in this model.
Overall, the coefficient estimates in the computer penetration regressions are similar. The
coefficients on telephone lines and electric power consumption are slightly smaller, and the
coefficients on income, years of schooling and regulatory quality are slightly larger. Somewhat
surprisingly, the weighted estimates are not overly sensitive to the exclusion of China and India.
For the Internet penetration rate regressions, we also find similar estimates after
weighting by population. In particular, we find that the coefficients on electric power
consumption, income, and regulatory quality are now slightly larger. The coefficient on years of
schooling is slightly smaller and the coefficient on telephone lines remains statistically
insignificant, but is now negative and small. These estimates are also not sensitive to excluding
China and India.
We also estimated random effects models using an extended period: 1995 to 2001. In the
computer regressions we find a larger coefficient on income, but smaller coefficients on years of
schooling and regulatory quality. The coefficient on telephone lines is very similar. The
coefficient on electric power consumption is now negative, but statistically insignificant. In the
Internet regressions, the coefficients on income and telephone lines are larger, and the
coefficients on years of schooling and regulatory quality are smaller. Surprisingly, the
coefficient on electric power consumption is large, negative and statistically significant. We are
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concerned, however, that 1995 to 1998 includes a period of time when annual growth rates in
computer and Internet penetration rates were increasing rapidly.

6. Explanations for the Global Digital Divide
6.1 Methodology
The regression analysis presented above reveals that factors such as income, human
capital, telecommunications, electricity, and regulatory quality, contribute to the global digital
divide. The analysis, however, does not identify the relative importance of these factors in
contributing to the alarming differences in computer and Internet penetration rates across regions
of the world. Another unanswered question is whether the explanations for low technology
penetration rates differ across regions of the world.
To explore these issues further we borrow from a technique of decomposing inter-group
differences in a dependent variable into those due to different observable characteristics across
groups and those due to different "prices" of characteristics of groups (see Blinder 1973 and
Oaxaca 1973). The technique has been widely used to decompose earnings gaps between whites
and blacks or men and women using microdata. The Blinder-Oaxaca technique, however, can be
used to decompose a gap between any two groups or even countries. In particular, the difference
between an outcome, Y, for group i and j can be expressed as:
(6.1)

Y i − Y j = ( X i − X j ) βˆ i + X j ( βˆ i − βˆ j ),

where X i is a row vector of average values for the individual-level characteristics and βˆ i is a
vector of coefficient estimates for group i. The first term in the decomposition represents the
part of the gap that is due to group differences in average values of the independent variables,
and the second term represents the part due to differences in the group processes determining the
outcome, which is often referred to as the "unexplained" component. The first term can be
further decomposed into the separate contributions from group differences in specific variables
and is the focus of the following analysis.
The technique is commonly modified to use coefficients from a pooled sample of both
groups, β̂ , to weight the first expression in the decomposition (see Oaxaca and Ransom 1994 for

example). We adopt this approach to calculate the decompositions. In particular, we use
coefficient estimates from regressions that include most countries (reported in column 2 of tables
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2 and 3). We then denote the United States as the base group and calculate the decomposition
for computer and Internet penetration rate gaps between the U.S. and each region. Thus, the first
term in the decomposition that captures the explained variation in penetration rates between the
United States and region j is:
(6.2)

( X US − X j ) βˆ ,

where β̂ are the coefficients and X represents the three-year average of the independent
variables included in the regressions. The technique allows us to quantify the separate
contributions from U.S./Region j differences in income, human capital, telephones, and other
factors, to the gaps in computer and Internet penetration rates.

6.2 Computer Use Contributions
Table 4 reports the results for contributions to the regional/U.S. gaps in computer
penetration rates. We report separate contribution estimates for regional differences in each of
the explanatory variables. As indicated above, all regions have much lower computer
penetration rates than the United States. The largest single factor contributing to these disparities
in penetration rates is per capital income. For all regions, except Europe and Central Asia,
differences in income explain approximately fifty percent of the gap in penetration rates. For
Europe and Central Asia, income differences explain 39.4 percent of the gap.
The large contributions to the computer penetration rate gaps are not surprising
considering the enormous disparities in income levels across regions of the world. The threeyear average per capita income (PPP adjusted) in the United States is $33,645. In contrast, per
capita income is only $3,077 in Sub-Saharan Africa and $2,473 in South Asia. The income gap
is likely affecting computer penetration by way of the cost relative to income. A personal
computer costing $1500 represents half of a person's average annual income in Sub-Saharan
Africa and more than half of their annual income in South Asia.
Although income is the largest contributing factor to the global digital divide it is clearly
not the only factor. This result also holds for analyses within countries. For example, using U.S.
microdata, Fairlie (2003) finds that income differences explain only 25 to 30 percent of the racial
gap in computer ownership. Another factor that provides a substantial contribution to the
computer penetration rate gaps is per capita telephone lines. This factor explains 35.0 to 40.7
percent of the regional gaps other than Europe and Central Asia. It explains 17.9 percent of the
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gap in this region. These results suggest that the assertion that the global digital divide is just a
manifestation of a long-standing disparity in telecommunications access appears to be partly true
(Dasgupta, et al. 2001). Interestingly, however, the effects of differences in telecommunications
infrastructure are not due to costs, at least as measured by monthly subscription and per minute
telephone charges. The contributions from these factors are essentially zero for all regions.
Regional differences in electric power consumption also contribute to the global digital
divide. This factor explains 6.8 percent of the gap between Europe and Central Asia and the
United States and from 15.1 to 17.8 percent of the gaps between other regions and the United
States. Undoubtedly, countries in which relatively few people have access to reliable electricity
provide limited opportunities for the use of personal computers. In this sense, it is possible that
the use of per capita electric power consumption understates the true contribution of access to
electricity to the regional gaps in computer penetration rates.
Interestingly, the United States and Europe and Central Asia have age distributions that
are disadvantaged in terms of computer penetration rates relative to the rest of the world. The
population in the United States is comprised of a lower percentage of children (ages 0-14) and a
higher percentage of the elderly (ages 65 and over) than the rest of the world with the exception
of Europe and Central Asia. The older population distribution in the United States combined
with the negative relationship between age and computer penetration works to widen the
technology gaps as evidenced by the negative contributions reported in table 4. In other words,
if other regions of the world had an age distribution that was more similar to the United States
the gaps in computer penetration rates would be even larger than they currently are. The one
exception is for Europe and Central Asia. For this region the older age distribution explains part
of the computer penetration rate gap.
The percent of the population living in urban areas also provides a negative contribution
in the decompositions. Most regions have substantially more "rural" populations than the United
States resulting in an advantaged geographical distribution in terms of computer use. The
computer penetration rate gaps with the United States would be from 6.1 to 13.7 percent higher if
these regions had a similar percentage of the population living in urban areas. The two
exceptions are Europe and Central Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean, which have
comparably sized urban populations.
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Human capital disparities, as measured by years of schooling, are important in
contributing to the global digital divide. Differences in education explain from 9.9 to 14.4
percent of the gaps in computer penetration rates. The average number of years of school range
from 3.7 years in Sub-Saharan Africa to 8.3 years in Europe and Central Asia. In contrast, the
average years of schooling in the United States is 12.1 years. Computers apparently require
substantial levels of education for use, limiting demand in countries with relatively low levels of
human capital. Hence, we confirm the findings of Caselli and Coleman (2001) and Pohjola
(2003). This finding is significant because it indicates that even after controlling for differences
in income, human capital disparities are important in creating a global digital divide. A parallel
result can be found in research using U.S. microdata to explain the digital divide across racial
groups. Demand for computers increases significantly with higher levels of education, resulting
in large independent contributions from education to gaps in computer use (Fairlie, 2003).
Regional differences in regulatory quality appear to contribute greatly to the global
digital divide. These differences explain roughly 10 percent of the gap in computer penetration
rates for most regions. In the Middle East and North Africa, differences in regulatory quality
explain nearly 15 percent of the gap in computer penetration. In Europe and Central Asia where
regulatory quality is more similar to the United States this factor explains only 4.7 percent of the
gap. Apparently, regulation has a negative net effect on technology adoption, partially explaining
why many developing countries have low computer penetration rates, which is broadly
consistent with the findings in Caselli and Coleman (2001). They find that their institutional
variable – an index of property rights -- has a positive effect on computer investment in their
largest sample. While in some of their smaller samples, including those that are less subject to
measurement error, the effect is not always statistically significant, we find this effect to be
robust across our specifications.
Finally, openness to trade, as measured by the percent of GDP represented by trade in
goods, is not an important factor in contributing to the global digital divide. For none of the
regions can this factor explain more than 1 percent of the gap in computer penetration rates. This
outcome contrasts strongly with the Caselli and Coleman (2001) finding that computer
investment, measured as computer imports, is highly dependent upon openness to imports from
the OECD countries. Their interpretation of this finding is that this effect represents a knowledge
spillover from importing manufactured goods.
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6.3 Internet Decomposition Results
Table 5 reports the results for contributions to regional/U.S. gaps in Internet penetration
rates. The most important factor contributing to the gaps is income. Regional differences in
gross national income per capita explain from 55.0 to 68.2 percent of the Internet penetration
gaps. Although the contributions to the Internet gaps are larger than the contributions to the
computer gaps in percentage terms, the actual contributions are similar.

Surprisingly, access

to telephones plays a smaller role in contributing to the regional gaps in Internet penetration
rates. Telephone lines per capital explain from 7.8 to 16.1 percent of the gaps in Internet
penetration rates. Furthermore, regional differences in monthly subscription or per call charges
explain essentially none of the gap in Internet penetration rates. The global digital divide
measured in Internet use appears to only partly be due to long-standing disparity in
telecommunications access and is not related to differential telecommunications costs.
Access to electricity is also crucial to Internet use. Regional differences in electric power
consumption explain 10.5 percent of the Internet penetration rate gap between Europe and
Central Asia and the United States, and 20.9 to 25.0 percent of the Internet penetrations rates
between other regions and the United States. The actual contributions are similar to those from
the computer penetration rate decompositions.
Similar to the results presented above, the age distribution of the United States, and
Europe and Central Asia limit the overall magnitude of the global digital divide. The effect,
however, is entirely because of the relatively small percentage of children in these countries and
not because of the relatively large percentage of the elderly compared to other regions of the
world.
The relatively urban United States also lessens the global digital divide. The Internet
penetration rate gaps would be larger for most regions as evidenced by the negative contribution
estimates. However, this effect is fairly small. Interestingly, our estimated coefficient is opposite
in sign from those obtained by Dasgupta et al. (2001) and APEC (2002). This suggests that the
identified urban effect may be sensitive to sample or specification or both.
Regional differences in education levels appear to explain part of the gap, however, some
caution is warranted in interpreting these results as they are based on a statistically insignificant
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coefficient estimate. The point estimate implies similar contributions as those for the computer
penetration rate decompositions.
The most notable difference between the results for the Internet penetration rate gaps and
those for the computer penetration rate gaps is the substantially larger magnitude of contributions
from regional differences in regulatory quality. Differences in regulatory quality explain 11.7
percentage of the gap between Europe/Central Asia and the United States and 18.2 to 32.0
percentage of the gap between other regions and the United States. Again, these findings are
consistent with those of Wallsten (2003) and suggest that regulation overall negatively affects
Internet use.

7. Conclusions

In this paper we have uncovered several interesting findings – some expected and some
unexpected. First, unsurprisingly, we confirm the importance of per capita income in explaining
the gap in computer and Internet use. But rather than being the dominant factor, in certain
instances the effect of other factors rival that of income. For instance, while 53.4 percent of the
gap between the United States and Sub-Saharan African PC use is accounted for by income
differentials, fully 40.7 percent of the gap can be attributed to the disparity in
telecommunications infrastructure.
Second, we find that in a broad sample encompassing developed and developing
countries, policy variables that have recently garnered attention – such as the pricing of
telecommunications access – do not show up as statistically or economically important in
explaining the Internet gap. This result should not be construed as implying that pricing policies
are not important. Rather, it suggests that such issues are swamped by economic, demographic
and institutional factors in samples with widely varying Internet penetration rates. Previous
studies highlighting this issue had focused on relatively narrow sets of countries, such as the
OECD countries.
Flowing from this conclusion is the third point: the quality of regulation is of great
importance. Differences in regulatory quality generally account for large portions of the gaps in
technology use. For instance, 32.0 percent of the US-Middle East/North Africa Internet gap is
associated with the difference in regulatory quality. In other words, our estimates suggest that
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nearly one-third of the Internet penetration rate gap would be closed if countries in the Middle
East and North Africa had similar regulatory quality as the United States.
We do not wish to imply that all our results are new or unexpected. Indeed, some are
quite consistent with the extant literature on the causes of the digital divide. For instance,
education does covary positively with the degree of PC and Internet use. But the degree to which
the difference in Internet rates depends upon this variable is surprisingly small. For most of the
regions, the effect of lower education is only about half the magnitude of the gap attributable to
differences in regulatory efficiency.
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Appendix
Variable Descriptions and Sources

Key:
ITU: International Telecommunications Union, World Telecommunication Indicators Database.
WDI: World Bank, World Development Indicators.
ES: World Bank, EdStats.
KKM: Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003).
Personal computers per 100 people: Estimates are derived from annual questionnaires
supplemented by other sources. Source: ITU.
Internet users per 100 people: The number of Internet users is based on reported estimates,
derivations based on reported Internet Access Provider (ISP) subscriber counts, or calculated by
multiplying the number of hosts by an estimated multiplier. Source: ITU.
Main telephone lines per 100 people: Main telephone lines refer to telephone lines connecting
a customer's equipment (e.g. telephone set, facsimile machine) to the Public Switched Telephone
Network (PSTN) and which have a dedicated port on a telephone exchange. For most countries,
main lines also include public payphones. Source: ITU.
Monthly telephone subscription charge: The monthly telephone subscription charge is the
average of the residential and business subscription charges and is converted to international
dollars using purchasing power parity rates provided by the World Bank. Monthly subscription
refers to the recurring fixed charge for subscribing to the Public Switched Telephone Network.
The charge covers the rental of the line but not the rental of the terminal (e.g., telephone set)
where the terminal equipment market is liberalized. Source: ITU, WDI, and authors’
calculations.
Cost of three minute local call: The cost of a three minute local call during peak rates is
converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates provided by the World
Bank. Source: ITU, WDI, and authors’ calculations.
Electric power consumption (kwh per capita): Source: WDI.
Population ages 0-14 (% of total): Source: WDI.
Population ages 65 and above (% of total): Source: WDI.
Urban population (% of total): Source: WDI.
Gross national income per capita: Gross national income is converted to international dollars
using purchasing power parity rates provided by the World Bank. An international dollar has the
same purchasing power over GNI as a U.S. dollar has in the United States. Source: WDI.
Trade in goods (% of GDP): Sum of exports and imports, divided by GDP. Source: WDI.
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Years of schooling: Average years of schooling of adults. Source: ES.
Regulatory quality: The regulatory quality index focuses specifically on the policies, including
measures of the incidence of market-unfriendly policies such as price controls or inadequate
bank supervision, as well as perceptions of the burdens imposed by excessive regulation in areas
such as foreign trade and business development. Source: KKM.
Rule of Law: A composite index that includes several indicators which measure the extent to
which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society. These include perceptions of
the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability
of contracts. An Unobserved Component Model (UCM) is used to aggregate the various
responses in the broad 6 clusters where the weights are proportional to the reliability of each
source. The resulting estimates of governance have an expected value (across countries) of zero,
and a standard deviation (across countries) of one. Source: KKM.
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Figure 1
World Computer and Internet Penetration Rates
International Telecommunications Union (1990-2001)
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Figure 2
Regional Computer Penetration Rates
International Telecommuncations Union (2001)
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Figure 3
Regional Internet Penetration Rates
International Telecommuncations Union (2001)
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Table 1
Computer and Internet Penetration Rates for Highest, Lowest and Largest Countries
International Telecommunications Union (2001)

Country
United States
Sweden
Denmark
Switzerland
Australia
Singapore
Norway
Korea (Rep. of)
Canada
Netherlands

Region
North America
Europe & Central Asia
Europe & Central Asia
Europe & Central Asia
East Asia & Pacfic
East Asia & Pacfic
Europe & Central Asia
East Asia & Pacfic
North America
Europe & Central Asia

Japan
Mexico
Brazil
Russia
China
Indonesia
Nigeria
India
Pakistan
Bangladesh

East Asia & Pacfic
Latin America & Caribbean
Latin America & Caribbean
Europe & Central Asia
East Asia & Pacfic
East Asia & Pacfic
Sub-Saharan Africa
South Asia
South Asia
South Asia

Benin
Chad
Cambodia
Burkina Faso
Mali
Angola
Malawi
Ethiopia
Myanmar
Niger

Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
East Asia & Pacfic
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
East Asia & Pacfic
Sub-Saharan Africa

Computers Internet Users
per 100
per 100
62.50
50.15
56.12
51.63
54.15
42.95
53.83
30.70
51.58
37.14
50.83
41.15
50.80
46.38
48.08
52.11
47.32
46.66
42.84
49.05

Population
(000s)
284,797
8,910
5,355
7,245
19,387
4,131
4,528
46,790
30,007
16,105

35.82
6.87
6.29
4.97
1.90
1.10
0.68
0.58
0.41
0.19

38.42
3.62
4.66
2.93
2.57
1.91
0.10
0.68
0.34
0.14

127,291
100,368
171,827
146,760
1,312,710
209,170
116,929
1,027,015
144,971
131,175

0.17
0.16
0.15
0.15
0.13
0.13
0.13
0.11
0.11
0.05

0.39
0.05
0.07
0.16
0.29
0.15
0.19
0.04
0.02
0.11

6,446
7,665
13,440
11,668
10,400
13,528
10,386
65,390
48,363
11,227

Table 2
Computer Penetration Rate Regressions (1999-2001)

(1)

(2)

Specification
(3)

Main telephone lines per
100 people

0.3921
(0.0785)

0.3546
(0.0784)

0.3642
(0.0681)

Monthly telephone
subscription charge

-0.0125
(0.0389)

-0.0018
(0.0385)

0.0159
(0.0347)

Cost of three minute local
call

-3.5479
(4.7353)

-4.3132
(4.6714)

-1.2930
(3.1691)

Electric power consumption
(kwh per capita)

0.0001
(0.0002)

0.0018
(0.0007)

0.0012
(0.0006)

Population ages 0-14
(% of total)

0.4934
(0.1515)

0.6126
(0.1550)

0.2568
(0.1451)

0.4623
(0.1289)

0.2283
(0.0915)

Population ages 65 and
above (% of total)

-0.7271
(0.3187)

-0.5871
(0.3195)

-0.4316
(0.2833)

-0.6376
(0.2747)

-0.2769
(0.2125)

Urban population (% of total)

-0.1313
(0.0388)

-0.1563
(0.0397)

-0.1303
(0.0370)

-0.1011
(0.0337)

-0.0675
(0.0232)

Gross national income per
capita (000s)

1.1669
(0.1628)

0.9636
(0.1779)

0.9220
(0.1586)

1.3503
(0.1405)

1.0670
(0.0955)

Years of schooling

0.9786
(0.4453)

0.9541
(0.4369)

Regulatory quality

3.6088
(0.7029)

3.8128
(0.6963)

2.6443
(0.5980)

3.0540
(0.6296)

1.9156
(0.4473)

Trade in goods (% of GDP)

-0.0082
(0.0085)

-0.0100
(0.0083)

-0.0072
(0.0072)

-0.0061
(0.0076)

0.0006
(0.0059)

14.14
227

-0.0054
(0.0473)
12.67
273

12.73
276

10.17
417

Explanatory Variables

Illiteracy rate
Average Computer Pen. Rate
Sample Size

14.14
227

(4)

(5)

0.3175
(0.0693)

0.3277
(0.0504)

0.7824
(0.3799)

Notes: (1) The dependent variable is the number of personal computers per 100 people. (2) Estimates account for
country-level random effects. (3) Standard errors are reported below coefficient estimates. (4) Specifications 2 and 3
include censored values for electric power consumption above 6000 kwh.

Table 3
Internet Penetration Rate Regressions (1999-2001)

(1)

(2)

Specification
(3)

Main telephone lines per
100 people

0.1211
(0.1018)

0.1075
(0.1069)

0.1663
(0.0897)

Monthly telephone
subscription charge

-0.0367
(0.0442)

-0.0296
(0.0470)

0.0013
(0.0419)

Cost of three minute local
call

-1.2782
(6.4403)

-1.0440
(6.6763)

1.8345
(4.5701)

Electric power consumption
(kwh per capita)

0.0008
(0.0002)

0.0019
(0.0009)

0.0018
(0.0008)

Population ages 0-14
(% of total)

0.5125
(0.1782)

0.7509
(0.1978)

0.4600
(0.1716)

0.5074
(0.1507)

0.3126
(0.1056)

Population ages 65 and
above (% of total)

0.0986
(0.3833)

0.1167
(0.4135)

0.3886
(0.3465)

-0.1068
(0.3293)

0.3864
(0.2481)

Urban population (% of total)

-0.0754
(0.0440)

-0.1127
(0.0492)

-0.0931
(0.0419)

-0.0720
(0.0381)

-0.0293
(0.0264)

Gross national income per
capita (000s)

0.8383
(0.2074)

0.9379
(0.2485)

0.6996
(0.2134)

1.3507
(0.1823)

0.9493
(0.1210)

Years of schooling

0.6799
(0.4963)

0.9100
(0.5326)

Regulatory quality

6.2244
(1.0072)

6.5585
(1.0377)

4.3089
(0.7991)

4.4878
(0.8630)

2.6861
(0.5835)

Trade in goods (% of GDP)

-0.0233
(0.0124)

-0.0335
(0.0126)

-0.0212
(0.0107)

-0.0257
(0.0107)

-0.0041
(0.0085)

12.38
228

-0.0259
(0.0523)
10.71
285

10.43
297

7.74
470

Explanatory Variables

Illiteracy rate
Average Computer Pen. Rate
Sample Size

12.38
228

(4)

(5)

0.1355
(0.0896)

0.1470
(0.0626)

0.5402
(0.4255)

Notes: (1) The dependent variable is the number of personal computers per 100 people. (2) Estimates account for
country-level random effects. (3) Standard errors are reported below coefficient estimates. (4) Specifications 2 and 3
include censored values for electric power consumption above 6000 kwh.

Table 4
Decomposition of Computer Penetration Rate for 1999-2001

Computer Penetration Rate
U.S. Rate
Gap
Contribution from differences in:
Main telephone lines per
100 people
Monthly telephone
subscription charge
Cost of three minute local
call
Electric power consumption
(kwh per capita)
Population ages 0-14
(% of total)
Population ages 65 and
above (% of total)
Urban population (% of total)
Gross national income per
capita (000s)
Years of schooling
Regulatory quality
Trade in goods (% of GDP)

East Asia
Europe and
and Pacific Central Asia
5.39
23.40
56.86
56.86
51.47
33.46

18.27
35.5%
-0.03
0.0%
0.30
0.6%
8.22
16.0%
-2.58
-5.0%
-3.15
-6.1%
-5.48
-10.7%
26.86
52.2%
5.12
9.9%
5.95
11.6%
0.25
0.5%

5.98
17.9%
-0.03
-0.1%
0.66
2.0%
2.28
6.8%
1.70
5.1%
1.13
3.4%
-0.21
-0.6%
13.20
39.4%
3.53
10.6%
1.59
4.7%
0.34
1.0%

Latin
Middle East
America and and North
Sub-Saharan
Caribbean
Africa
South Asia
Africa
5.00
3.57
0.43
1.68
56.86
56.86
56.86
56.86
51.86
53.29
56.43
55.18

18.13
35.0%
-0.02
0.0%
0.58
1.1%
7.81
15.1%
-6.37
-12.3%
-4.26
-8.2%
-0.10
-0.2%
25.69
49.5%
5.66
10.9%
4.25
8.2%
0.15
0.3%

19.41
36.4%
-0.05
-0.1%
0.17
0.3%
8.41
15.8%
-8.41
-15.8%
-4.88
-9.2%
-3.24
-6.1%
27.40
51.4%
6.19
11.6%
7.88
14.8%
0.19
0.4%

22.55
40.0%
0.00
0.0%
0.46
0.8%
10.07
17.8%
-8.24
-14.6%
-4.70
-8.3%
-7.75
-13.7%
30.04
53.2%
7.04
12.5%
6.49
11.5%
0.04
0.1%

22.45
40.7%
-0.03
0.0%
0.96
1.7%
9.10
16.5%
-12.23
-22.2%
-5.41
-9.8%
-5.73
-10.4%
29.45
53.4%
7.92
14.4%
6.42
11.6%
0.22
0.4%

Note: The coefficient estimates used in these calculations are from Specification 2 of Table 2. See text for more details on calculations.

Table 5
Decomposition of Internet Penetration Rate for 1999-2001

Internet Penetration Rate
U.S. Rate
Gap
Contribution from differences in:
Main telephone lines per
100 people
Monthly telephone
subscription charge
Cost of three minute local
call
Electric power consumption
(kwh per capita)
Population ages 0-14
(% of total)
Population ages 65 and
above (% of total)
Urban population (% of total)
Gross national income per
capita (000s)
Years of schooling
Regulatory quality
Trade in goods (% of GDP)

East Asia
Europe and
and Pacific Central Asia
5.34
20.34
43.69
43.69
38.35
23.35

5.54
14.4%
-0.41
-1.1%
0.07
0.2%
8.82
23.0%
-3.16
-8.3%
0.63
1.6%
-3.95
-10.3%
26.15
68.2%
4.88
12.7%
10.23
26.7%
0.84
2.2%

1.81
7.8%
-0.50
-2.1%
0.16
0.7%
2.45
10.5%
2.09
8.9%
-0.22
-1.0%
-0.15
-0.7%
12.85
55.0%
3.37
14.4%
2.73
11.7%
1.15
4.9%

Latin
Middle East
America and and North
Sub-Saharan
Caribbean
Africa
South Asia
Africa
3.59
1.31
0.43
1.31
43.69
43.69
43.69
43.69
40.10
42.38
43.26
42.38

5.50
13.7%
-0.26
-0.6%
0.14
0.3%
8.40
20.9%
-7.81
-19.5%
0.85
2.1%
-0.08
-0.2%
25.01
62.4%
5.41
13.5%
7.32
18.2%
0.51
1.3%

5.89
13.9%
-0.79
-1.9%
0.04
0.1%
9.04
21.3%
-10.31
-24.3%
0.97
2.3%
-2.34
-5.5%
26.67
62.9%
5.90
13.9%
13.55
32.0%
0.64
1.5%

6.84
15.8%
-0.05
-0.1%
0.11
0.3%
10.82
25.0%
-10.10
-23.4%
0.94
2.2%
-5.59
-12.9%
29.24
67.6%
6.71
15.5%
11.17
25.8%
0.12
0.3%

6.81
16.1%
-0.41
-1.0%
0.23
0.5%
9.78
23.1%
-15.00
-35.4%
1.07
2.5%
-4.13
-9.7%
28.67
67.7%
7.56
17.8%
11.04
26.1%
0.74
1.8%

Note: The coefficient estimates used in these calculations are from Specification 2 of Table 3. See text for more details on calculations.

